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REVIEWS

Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology. Edited by FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Sociology and History of Civilization in Columbia University. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. xxiv+553.

This is a kind of source-book of sociology. The aim as set forth in the Preface has been to offer to the beginner in sociological studies "significant examples of the great facts of social evolution, and of their interpretation." The author adds that as an outline of social theory it is "more complete in scope than anything" he has offered in previous volumes.

The volume is divided into two "books": Book I, "Society and Sociology," treating of the nature and kinds of societies (64 pages); and Book II (embracing the rest of the volume), "The Elements and Structure of Society," treating in four Parts of "The Social Population" (Part I), "The Social Mind" (Part II), "Social Organization" (Part III), and "The Social Welfare" (Part IV).

The author, as in his previous writings, defends the psychological as against the organic theory of the nature of society. He distinguishes four leading forms of the psychological theory: (1) The contract theory according to which the psychological origin of society is found in a "perception of the utility of association," and is usually rationalistic in form; (2) the impression theory in which society is viewed as a "phenomenon closely allied to suggestion and hypnosis" and the elementary social fact is seen in the constraining power, the impression, the contagious influence that an aggregation, a mass, of living beings, exerts upon each individual mind; (3) the imitation theory, which explains impression, contagion, influence, as forms of the interaction of mind with mind, "as modes of example and imitation." These three he regards as simply developed forms of the "sympathy" theory of society. As contrasted with these he puts forward his own theory as a developed form of the instinct theory—the theory (4) of the consciousness of kind. This theory, as that of Aristotle, assumes that the most elementary form of social relationship is discovered in the very begin-

ning of mental phenomena. It offers, the author says, "a simple and consistent view of the relation between social life and the material universe."

It assumes that the original causes of society lie in the material environment, which may be regarded as an infinitely differentiated group of stimuli of like-response, and, therefore, of collective action; while the products of past social life, constituting the historical tradition, become in their turn secondary stimuli, or secondary causes, in the social process (p. 8).

In its simplest form mental activity is a response of sensitive matter to a stimulus. Any given stimulus may happen to be felt by more than one organism, at the same or at different times. Two or more organisms may respond to the same given stimulus simultaneously or at different times. They may respond to the same given stimulus in like or in unlike ways; in the same or in different degrees; with like or with unlike promptitude; with equal or with unequal persistence. I have attempted to show that in like-response to the same given stimulus we have the beginning, the absolute origin, of all concerted activity—the inception of every conceivable form of co-operation; while in unlike response, and in unequal response, we have the beginning of all those processes of individuation, of differentiation, of competition, which, in their endlessly varied relations to combination, to co-operation, bring about the infinite complexity of organized social life (p. 67).

While in this introductory statement the two principles appear to be assigned equal importance in the evolution of society, we find that in the course of the treatment throughout the book the principle of variation or diversification is almost completely subordinated to the principle of identity or similarity. Resemblance or likeness of organic response, of sympathetic or deliberative co-operation, like-mindedness, is the fundamental social category. This may be merely a matter of kinship, blood relationship, of potential or unconscious similarity, of mental or moral likeness, or it may be a conscious recognition of identity of interests and ideals. Before proceeding to a consideration of what to the reviewer are the dangers in this exclusive emphasis on the category of resemblance, it will be well to pause to point out certain other ambiguities in the use of terms which (perhaps inevitably in the present state of sociology) complicate the situation so far as its methodological aspect is concerned.

This has to do with certain psychological and philosophical terms which are introduced into the discussion without definition or without clearly indicating their meaning in relation to other uses current in allied sciences. Chief among these may be mentioned the terms "social mind," "mental" and "physical," "intermental action," "like-

mindfulness;" the repeated distinction between "objective" and "subjective" factors in social process; and the phrase "consciousness of kind."

By "social mind" the author says that he does not mean any other consciousness than that of individual minds. The social mind is the phenomenon of individual minds acting simultaneously, and especially of individual minds in communication with one another acting concurrently. The social mind

may be defined as the like-responsiveness to stimulation, the concurrent feeling and intelligence, the consciousness of kind, and the concerted volition of two or more individuals (p. 185).

This presumably is what the author means by "social process as a psychological phenomenon." But what then is meant when the social mind is spoken of as putting "its impress on each component group" and molding it "into conformity with a certain type" (p. 499), and when it is spoken of as giving approval or disapproval, or in such a phrase as "The social mind has always perceived this truth, etc." (p. 517)? Here the social mind is all but personified. In the discussion of sovereignty attention is called to the "essentially psychological nature of the phenomenon" (p. 363), "more specifically, the mode of sovereignty . . . is determined by the type of mind and the mode of like-mindedness then and there prevailing" (p. 363). But what is meant by the word "mind" here and, furthermore, how are the minds conceived in a theory which makes use of the phrase "intermental activity" (pp. 11, 312, and *passim*)? Is it interaction between minds as such or minds as embodied in organisms? If the latter, how does intermental activity differ from the ordinary process of social communication?

One may not read the book thoughtfully and avoid asking the question what is meant by the "resemblance of two or more minds to one another" (p. 304). Doubtless this is the key to the meaning of the "intermental action." But the problem is, in what sense does the category of resemblance apply? On p. 332 "like-mindedness" is made to result from the development of the simultaneous like-reponses of a plural number of individuals through the consciousness of kind into concerted volition. The total phenomenon of resemblance thus established is called "like-mindedness." Here obviously the term "mind" must embrace the physical and social expressions of mental states, if indeed it must not be confined to that, since there would seem to be no point (even granting that it

were an intelligible notion) in asserting similarity between minds abstracted from their physicosocial embodiments.

But if this is the meaning of the term "resemblance" what is the force of the distinction between the "subjective" and "objective" factors and conditions, which recurs throughout the book? One is led by reading certain passages to suspect that minds are conceived in an isolative individualistic way, as when "purely individualistic motives and methods" are spoken of as being made over into "socialized motives and methods" (p. 305), and when "instinctive response to stimulus," bodily appetites and desires, are regarded as more individualistic than emotion, thought, and rational desire, though in other passages the essentially social nature of the individual consciousness is emphasized. But on either interpretation the use of the terms "mental," "physical," and "subjective," "objective," remains ambiguous. In one passage the author says:

In all social as in all psychological phenomena, physical and mental processes are correlated.

Scientific psychology has found one way, and only one, to avoid any assumption of either materialism or idealism, in the philosophical sense of those words. It consists in centering attention upon the correlations of material and mental phenomena, rather than on the nature of things in themselves. External things are conceived as stimuli, and internal processes are conceived as responses to stimuli. Causation within the realm of mental phenomena, is thus regarded as psychophysical. It is a process in which the mental order changes in definite ways corresponding to changes in an external order. To discover these ways and to formulate their laws is a sufficient scientific achievement in psychology. It is unnecessary to raise any question of the identity, or of the duality, of mind and matter (p. 178-179).

Yet in another passage the author speaks of "sheer mental force" (p. 154) and of the "purely mental processes of appreciation" (p. 374) as opposed to the "motor processes of utilization," and throughout the book the distinction is made between "subjective" and "objective" conditions of social process (cf. pp. 125, 183, 299, 304, 315). There seems to be a tendency to profit by all the methodological license which the hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism affords while abjuring its metaphysical implications.

Finally it may be suggested that the meaning of such words as "stimulus" and "response" in such a connection as this is far from being self-evident. "A key to the understanding of society, in both its organization and its historical development, is always to

be found in a study of stimuli" (p. 178), says the author, and the Index refers to the discussion of stimulation and response under the heading "Formation of the Social Mind," but neither of these suggestive ideas is worked out.

The awareness of resemblances and differences by the resembling individuals themselves is called "consciousness of kind." It may be little more than "a feeling of sympathy," or it may become a "clear-cut perception." It is rooted in habitual like-responses, in mental and practical resemblance; it leads, on the other hand, to conscious "concerted volition." "In like-responses to common stimuli we have the substance, or subject-matter, of social phenomena."

Chapter iii of Part II is devoted to an analysis of the "subjective phenomena" which "accompany" at least the higher stages of "mental and practical resemblance." These subjective phenomena consist of various modes and degrees of awareness on the part of the individuals themselves *that they are alike*. Collectively these facts are designated by the phrase "consciousness of kind." This consciousness of kind is a social and a socializing force, sometimes exceedingly delicate and subtle in its action, sometimes turbulent and all-powerful (p. 275). "So far as we have any reason of knowing, the consciousness of kind is the only social consciousness" (p. 185). "The consciousness of kind," we are told, "is that pleasurable state of mind which includes organic sympathy, the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition" blended in an integral experience. These five modes of consciousness are not independent of one another. Only by a process of scientific analysis may they be thought of singly. In actual experience they are united in a state of mind that, for the moment, seems perfectly simple (p. 288-289). "Using the word 'sympathy' as a collective word for all the feelings that are included in the consciousness of kind, the law of sympathy is: The degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases" (p. 298), i. e., the degree of sympathy varies directly with the concrete elements in the resemblance.

"A relatively perfect consciousness of kind can exist only in minds that are in a high degree alike" (p. 303). We experience recognition and sympathy from the human beings who surround us "in a gradation that corresponds to their degrees of resemblance to ourselves" (p. 302). And if it is not obvious upon the surface,

in the last analysis social assimilation depends upon "potential" resemblance.

The question almost inevitably arises in the mind of the reader when he comes upon these extreme statements of the resemblance theory and the consciousness of kind as the ultimate principle, whether after all the consciousness of difference is not as important a factor in friendship, say, as the consciousness of resemblance. Why the exclusive emphasis on the capacity of two people *to become alike*? May not the mutual enhancement of differences be an equally vital and fundamental basis of such a relationship? Is there not at least a grain of truth in Heraclitus and Hegel?

When individuals have become *aware* of their resemblances in purposive action they *consciously* co-operate to realize their common interests. Spontaneous like-response becomes "concerted volition" (p. 326). Here again, it is not indicated what are the types of situation, of social adjustment, which demand or permit of this transformation of the primary biological response into a conscious and deliberate co-operation. Does this take place inevitably or only under certain conditions of social stress, the clashing of social groups, of established customs, institutions, traditions, and codified beliefs? Here seems to be the point in the author's argument for the consideration of those phenomena of conflict which he himself has recognized and to which certain writers give a prominent place in their social theory under such titles as "Social Crises." Here is the natural place for the specific application of the principle of the universal process of conflict which is invoked in the earlier pages (cf. p. 97; also p. 128). All modes of activity, he says, are in one aspect a conflict (p. 161). Invention results from the combination of conflicting imitations (p. 314). Fashion is the product of the attrition of customs (p. 314). And he speaks of the substitution of intellectual for merely physical strife on the higher levels of human culture. All thought and feeling involve the conflict of sensations (p. 161). And discussion is shown to be an accompaniment if not the essential factor in progress (pp. 324, 325, 345).

But the emphasis is not placed upon the conflict as the condition of this metamorphosis, but rather on "similarities and repetitions" among the conflicts. "Some conflicts are like other conflicts" (p. 97). The author points out, to be sure, that the rapidity of the transformation from the spontaneous to the consciously concerted action, as well as its extent and the forms which

it assumes, depends upon "subjective" conditions, by which, he goes on to explain, he means "types of mind, of disposition, and of character, and the degree of the consciousness of kind" (p. 326). But the term "subjective" here as elsewhere is ambiguous. Does he mean subjective in the sense of individual or in the sense of mental? His earlier statement that all social phenomena are psychophysical in character would seem to preclude the latter interpretation, yet the former interpretation is not clearly indicated, unless the "objective" conditions (which he enumerates in the passage which immediately follows) are to be interpreted in the narrower sense of the "social."

In places the author does give explicit recognition to the function of the individual in the reconstruction of social custom and belief, as, for example, when he insists upon the necessity of freedom of speech and of public meeting (p. 346). He goes so far, indeed, as to admit that rational thinking as it takes place in the individual "consists in the interposition of new ideas between stimulation and the consequent muscular action. The tendency of the crowd, as we have seen, is to react instantly as a unit upon any suggestion, just as the tendency of non-rational man is to expend his nervous energy in reflex action. In the individual this process is interrupted by any new idea or suggestion" (p. 346). And he admits that here may be "a large factor of constraint" involved in bringing about concerted volition.

But he says that under normal conditions concerted action begins spontaneously. But if it is true that "history abounds in example of votes cast by ecclesiastical councils and legislative bodies in practically enforced obedience to the commands of a dictator" (p. 327), and if this is to be interpreted as a genuinely resistant element, the question would arise as to whether the *normal* conditions under which this transition takes place are not rather the conditions of tension or conflict which according to him are exceptions to the rule. Certainly the illustrations he cites lend themselves readily to such an interpretation: cf. the description of "The Assembly of the Argives," "The Argives' Launching of the Ships," "Wat Tyler's Rebellion," "Cryng One's Wrongs in China," "The French Revolution," etc. (pp. 327-37).

As would be expected from the emphasis previously laid upon "mental and practical resemblance," this is made the basis likewise of concerted volition. "The possible extent of concerted volition" is determined by the facts of "mental and practical resemblance."

"Other things being equal, the greater the mental and practical homogeneity of a population, the greater is the possible extent of concerted volition" (pp. 330, 331). Yet is it not true that it is just the "differences of language, of religion, of education, of economic standards and opportunities, and of moral standards" which in the first instance creates the demand for and makes possible this conscious and deliberate co-operation in revision of standards and mutual adjustment of social habits? This seems to be virtually admitted when it is stated that "the more heterogeneous a group . . . the stronger must be the stimuli to produce like-response and a common will" (p. 331), i. e., stating it in the obverse form, the greater the social tension, the more violent the stimuli, the more revolutionary the transition—the greater the gain on the side of conscious co-operation when a concerted volition is finally reached.

If, as the author says (p. 334), it is under conditions of mob action that the "individual loses his own feeling of responsibility," and "gives way to impulses, which, if he were alone, he would control," then presumably it is under conditions of resistance on the part of the individual against this dominating influence of the group, that the conscious and deliberative type of action may arise.

The process by which doubt is created [says the author], by which criticism is instituted, and judgments arrived at in society, is called discussion. In discussion conflicting beliefs are compared, analyzed, and subjected to argument. So long as men accept as true everything that they hear repeated, or that they themselves are prone to believe, their talk is not to be described as discussion. It becomes discussion only when some one disputes or denies, and thereby compels those who assert to give reasons or to advance arguments in support of what they affirm (pp. 344, 345). Public opinion comes into existence only when a sympathetic like-mindedness or an agreement in belief is subjected to criticism, started by some sceptical individual (p. 345).

If this is so, if "deliberation begins when belief is assailed by doubt," and if it is only "after passing through an experience of questioning and uncertainty" that the individual arrives at "judgments for which he can give reasons," it would seem that this factor of doubt and the individual consciousness in which it appears play the crucial part in the transformation of spontaneous like-mindedness into concerted volition. And it would seem that he ought to make this principle of the "diversification of co-operation" (355) the basal category of this phenomenon of transition.

Our author speaks of "tensions in the social system consequent

upon abuses of liberty and excesses of individualism" (p. 420), as though they were abnormal phenomena instead of representing the normal way in which society differentiates. The element of conflict is attributed to the imperfection of the development of the spontaneous forms of like-mindedness which if left to themselves, he says, would "end in an aimless activity, or in mere uproar and confusion" (p. 352). The social tension which is the condition of the development of conscious individuality, instead of being given a positive function, is treated in a purely negative way as a disturbing element. But, as long as the element of conflict upon which individuality rests is treated in this way, is it possible to state the true significance of democracy which, as the author seems willing to grant, provides the machinery for utilizing just these conflicts for the progressive differentiation of the social whole?

On Professor Giddings' theory some form of static social and mental equilibrium seems to be the only possible goal, especially if it be true that "all inequality . . . is necessarily unstable, tending at all times through equilibration to break down into equality" (p. 420). "Unlike-mindedness as a means of variation and progress" deserves a place of equal importance by the side of like-mindedness which is made "the essential basis of social organization in every stage of its history" (p. 430). It is only fair to place alongside of the sentence just quoted such passages as the following (which the reviewer has not been able to reconcile with it and which do not seem to have any effect by way of modification of the fundamental principle of resemblance and consciousness of kind): "The development of the social constitution is proportional to the growth of an appreciation of the value of variety or unlikeness in society" (p. 517, 518). Society, he adds, creates the higher from the lower types of life "by multiplying helpful variations, and subsequently selecting the best results" (p. 523). But there is no attempt apparently to give even a descriptive technique of such variation. While a great deal of space is given to the statement of the principle of conservation, the principle of continuity, resemblance, consciousness of kind, etc., there is no corresponding elaboration of the facts of these variations nor of the laws of that social resistance or attrition by which these variations factor in the development of individual consciousness for the evolution of society. Progress is distinguished from mere evolution as that stage in which "the unit of the integrated mass or group becomes an end as well as a

means" (p. 523). But though "psychological" analyses recur throughout the treatment, one looks in vain for any analysis, in relation to the social process, of what is meant by this sense of *being an end*, and for any satisfactory statement of the conditions under which this remarkable transformation takes place.

One word more. It is assumed throughout that the law of action in the physical world holds for social phenomena: namely, that action is always along the line of least resistance. In the mental and social realm this becomes the law of least effort. Sympathy and affection result from habits of like-response to the same or to like stimuli. Sympathy and affection, therefore, go out most to those who most resemble ourselves, simply because, under these conditions of genesis, such is the direction of least difficulty (pp. 299, 300). But it is also stated that the higher intellectual processes are "differential consequences of mental activity in the paths of least effort" (p. 419). If this is so, what becomes of the distinction between action along the line of least, and action along the line of greatest, resistance? How are conscious reactions to be distinguished from habitual reactions? Or is this distinction of no import for sociology? It occurs to the reviewer that this difficulty at bottom is the same as that which underlies Professor Giddings' extreme emphasis upon the resemblance category.

In conclusion the reviewer wishes to add that while these remarks are mainly critical in character they express rather the deep interest which he has in the fundamental issues which Professor Giddings' book raises than any desire to ignore the many positive merits which the book has, and which will certainly secure it a wide reading among those who are interested in the sources of sociological theory and in the author's own theory of their value and interpretation for a science of society. H. HEATH BAWDEN

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Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society. By LESTER F. WARD. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906. Pp. xviii+384.

The brilliant completion of Ward's "system of social philosophy" is an event of world-wide scientific interest. As the achievement of one mind, that system challenges comparison with the